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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the law reporters have been replete with cases dis-
cussing, exploring, expanding, and sometimes distorting section 10(b) of
* Former Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor, Legal
Research and Writing I and II.
** Senior, University of Miami School of Law. The authors gratefully acknowledge
the guidance received from Professor James Mofsky in the preparation of this article.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
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the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10B-5.2 The provisions have been so liberally construed
that the decisions employing them have become the classic examples of
judicial law-making.
Few attorneys apparently realize that the Pandora's Box of Rule
10B-5 has a mirror image in the Florida Securities Act. Indeed, section
517.301 of the Florida Statutes is nearly identical in wording to its fed-
eral counterpart.3 Yet no Florida cases have considered its construction;
nor has it been used, like the federal Sword of Damocles, to achieve
expanding remedial objectives.
Two alternative conclusions are possible from the dearth of litigation.
Either lawyers are unaware of the existence or possibilities of section
517.301, or no fraudulent devices are currently being used in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities in Florida corporations. While the
former conclusion is perhaps reasonable, the latter hypothesis is, unfor-
tunately, highly improbable and should be rejected as contrary to the
normal state of affairs.'
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1958):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3. FLA. STATS. § 517.301 (1967): It is unlawful, and a violation of the provisions
of this chapter, for any person:
(1) In the sale or purchase of any security in this state, including any security
exempted under the provisions of § 517.05, and including any securities sold in any
transaction exempted under the provisions of § 517.06, directly or indirectly:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(b) To obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of
a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading;
(c) To engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
(2) To publish, give publicity to, or circulate any notice, circular, advertise-
ment, newspaper, article, letter, investment service, communication or broadcast
which though not purporting to offer a security for sale, describes such security
for a consideration received or to be received directly or indirectly from an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer, or from an agent or employee of an issuer, underwriter or
dealer, without fully disclosing the receipt whether past or prospective, of such
consideration and the amount thereof.
(3) In any matter within the jurisdiction of the Florida securities commission
to knowingly and willfully falsify, conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme, or
device, a material fact, or make any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or
representation, or make or use any false writing or document, knowing the same
to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry.
4. Another possible reason for the absence of litigation may be that actions which
could be filed under FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (1967) are instead being filed in the federal courts
under the federal statute. There are numerous instances, however, where the means of
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Because of the absence of interpretation or application of section
517.301 and because of the lack of interpretation in other jurisdictions of
similar statutes, it is clear to the authors that some guidelines might ap-
propriately be drawn for the proper use of the statute. This necessarily
requires analogy to the construction given SEC Rule 10B-5. While adop-
tion by the Florida courts of the federal construction is not a legal im-
perative, it does appear to be highly probable in view of the identity of
purposes of the two securities statutes.
Therefore, it shall be the purpose of this article to explore the pos-
sible contours of section 517.301 liability, to examine the possible appli-
cation of this liability to recurrent corporate problems, and to suggest,
in anticipation of some predictable difficulties, admendments to the stat-
ute.'
II. COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF STATE DISCLOSURE STATUTES
A. Other Jurisdictions
The great majority of the states which have adopted fraud provi-
sions and disclosure statutes have based the legislation on section 101 of
the Uniform Securities Act, which provides:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale,
or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person. 6
Section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act is nearly identical in word-
ing to Rule 1OB-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission,7 which
in turn was modeled after section 17(a) of the Federal Securities Act
of 1933.1 Unlike section 17(a), however, which requires disclosure by
interstate commerce may not have been used. In these situations, the federal statute will
be inapplicable and resort will have to be made to the state remedy.
5. For other recent articles dealing with this rapidly expanding area of securities law
see Klein, The Extension of a Private Remedy to Defrauded Securities Investors Under
SEC Rule IOB-5, 20 U. MIAmi L. REV. 81 (1965); Manne, Insider Trading and the Ad-
ministrative Process, 35 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 473 (1967); Comment, Fiduciary Suits Under
Rule 1OB-5, 1968 DUKE L.J. 791 (1968); Comment, Rule 1OB-5: Elements of a Private
Right of Action, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 541 (1968).
6. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 101.
7. See note 2 supra.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964):
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
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sellers of securities, SEC Rule 1OB-5 and section 101 of the Uniform
Securities Act are designed to force disclosure by both sellers and pur-
chasers of securities.
Twenty states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have adopted
section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act verbatim.' Five additional
states, Alaska, 1° New Mexico, 1 Oregon, 2 Virginia, 3 and West Virgina, 4
have adopted section 101 with some important modifications or deletions.
Arizona, 1 Mississippi, 6 North Dakota, 7 Tennessee, 8 and Vermont 9
have adopted disclosure provisions which are slightly similar to section
101. In all states which have enacted the disclosure provisions liability
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
9. ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 28, as amended (Supp. 1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1235
(1966) ; COLO. REV. STAT. § 125-1-1 (1963) ; D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-2402 (1951) ; IDAHO GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 30-1403 (1967) ; IND. STAT. ANN. § 25-866 (Burns, 1960), as amended (Supp.
1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1253 (1963); Ky. REV. STAT. § 292.320 (1963); MD. CODE
ANN. art. 32A, § 14 (1957), as amended (1967) ; MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 451.502 (1948),
as amended (Supp. 1964); Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.101 (1959); MONT. REV. CODE § 15-2005
(1947), as amended (Supp. 1961); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1102 (1943), as amended (Supp.
1965) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.110 (1959), as amended (Supp. 1965) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-
52 (1937), as amended (Supp. 1967) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 101 (1951), as amended (Supp.
1965); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10, ch. 37 § 851 (1963), as amended (Supp. 1963); S.C. CODE
§ 62-201 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-1 (1953), as amended (Supp. 1963); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.010 (1951), as amended (Supp. 1959); WYo. STAT. § 17-117.1
(1957), as amended (Supp. 1965).
10. ALAS. STAT. 45.55.010 (1962). Alaska modified subsection (2) of the UNIFORM SE-
CURITIES ACT § 101 as follows: "To make an untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state a material fact the omission of which makes a statement made misleading."
11. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-29 (1953). The New Mexico version makes violation of
one of the subsections "fraudulent" as well as "unlawful."
12. ORE. REV. STAT. § 59.135 (1967) makes it unlawful to do one of the acts pro-
hibited in UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 101 in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security or
the conduct of a securities business or for any person who receives any consider-
ation from another person primarily for advising the other person as to the value
of securities or their purchase or sale whether through the issuance of analyses or
reports or otherwise.
13. VA. CODE § 13.1-502 (1950). The Virginia version adds the wording in subsection
(2) "to obtain money or property by means" of any of the prohibited acts. The authors
suggest that this creates a privity requirement. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
14. W. VA. CODE § 32-1-17 (1966). This statute limits the scope of its provisions to
injunction proceedings.
15. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-199 (1956) includes transactions occurring "within or from"
the state.
16. Miss. CODE ANN. § 5380 (1942), as amended (Supp. 1958) expressly limits the po-
tential cause of action to fraudulent practices, thus eliminating a claim based upon a
negligent act.
17. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-04-15 (1960) contains all the substantive provisions
of SEC Rule 10B-5.
18. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1644 (1964) excludes subsection (2) of the UNIFORM SE-
CuRrrIES ACT § 101 and SEC Rule 10B-5.
19. VT. STAT. ANN. § 9-4224 (1959) restricts the operation of its disclosure statute to
injunction proceedings.
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is imposed, as under the federal acts, regardless of whether the prohibited
act or omission occurs in connection with securities or transactions which
are exempt from state registration requirements."0
B. Florida
In compiling section 517.301 of the Florida Statutes, the draftsmen
followed the basic framework of section 17(a) of the Federal Securities
Act of 1933 and SEC Rule 10B-5. 21 However, the Florida statute has
excluded certain wording of both the Rule and the 1933 Act. The word
"offer," for example, is conspicuously absent from the provisions of the
Florida version.22 This omission, however, may be covered by the defini-
tion of "sale" in section 517.02(3)." Subsection (b) contains the intro-
ductory phrase "to obtain money or property . . . ." by means of one or
more of the prohibited acts. 4 While this phrase is included in section
17(a) of the 1933 Federal Securities Act, 25 it is not included in either the
Uniform Securities Act26 or SEC Rule 1OB-5.2 Moreover, the addition of
this phrase may impose a requirement of privity of contract to sue which
is not imposed under either the SEC rule or the Uniform Securities Act.2 1
Subsection (c) of the Florida provision has several important modi-
fications. Under section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act, the fraud sec-
tion applies to all "acts" in violation of its provisions.2" However, under
the Florida statute, subsection (c) applies only to prohibited "transac-
tions."13 0 Furthermore, while the Uniform Securities Act, the federal act,
and the SEC rule make all the disclosure provisions applicable to the pro-
hibited acts or omissions done "in connection with" the purchase or sale
of a security.31 the Florida statute applies this liberal wording only to
subsection (c) .32
20. See notes 3, 9-19 supra.
21. Interview with Milton J. Wallace, General Counsel for the Florida Securities Com-
mission, in Miami, Florida, Nov. 15, 1968.
22. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (1967) set forth at note 3 supra. It should be noted
that while Florida had adopted the UNIFORM SECURITIEs ACT, it has substantially modified
§ 101.
23. FLA. STAT. § 517.02(3) (1967) provides:
"Sale" or "sell" includes every disposition or attempt to dispose of a security or
interest in a security for value. Any security given or delivered with or as a bonus
on account of any purchase of securities or any other thing shall be conclusively
presumed to constitute a part of the subject of such purchase and to have been
sold for value. "Sale" or "sell" also includes a contract to sell, an exchange, an
attempt to sell, an option of sale, a solicitation of a sale, a subscription or an offer
to sell, directly or by an agent, or a :rcular letter, advertisement or otherwise ....
24. FLA. STAT. § 517.301(b) (1967). See note 3 supra.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964). See note 8 supra.
26. See text at 595.
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1958). See note 2 supra.
28. See text at 606 infra.
29. See text at 595 supra.
30. FLA. STAT. § 517.301(c) (1967). See note 3 supra.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1958); Uniform Securities Act
§ 101. See notes 1, 2, 6, and 8 supra.
32. FLA. STAT. § 517.301(c) (1967). See note 3 supra.
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These modifications and deletions, as will be seen below, have a sub-
stantial impact on the construction given the statute. Where appropriate,
the possible ramifications of the differences in wording will be discussed.
Recognizing these changes, however, it is appropriate at this point to
consider the history and development of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 1OB-5.13
III. ORIGINS OF CIVIL LIABILITY
A. Federal Development
Section 10(b) was unceremoniously promulgated in 1934 in the fol-
lowing clear language:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regu-
lations as the commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
In 1942, in order to adequately protect the "public interest," the
Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated Rule 1OB-5 announc-
ing the following:
the new rule closes a loophole in protections against fraud
administered by the commission by prohibiting individuals or
companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in
their purchase . . .4
Realizing the potential ramifications of this broad language, the com-
mission one year later conducted an investigation into transactions con-
nected with Ward La France Trade Corporation, "to call attention to
Rule X-10B-5."35
If the use of 10(b) were limited to administrative and criminal
actions, its application would be relatively unimportant. But in 1946, a
federal district court in Kardon v. The National Gypsum Co. 6 ruled that
the words "unlawful" in the statute also implied a right of civil remedy
by the seller against a buyer of securities. This decision seemed to be
33. For an excellent review of the entire area of Rule lOB-5 see Klein, The Extension
of a Private Remedy to Defrauded Securities Investors Under SEC Rule 1OB-5, 20 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 81 (1965).
34. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3230 at 183-84 (May 21, 1942).
35. Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 SEC 373 (1943).
36. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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inconsistent with reasonable statutory construction. Indeed, Congress has
expressly provided for civil liability in sections 11(a), 7 12(1), 88 and
12(2)" 9 of the 1933 Act. In the 1934 Act, sections 9,4" 15,"' 1642 and 1848
contain express civil remedy provisions. When Congress wanted to pro-
vide a civil remedy it had no reluctance to do so, nor was it clumsy in
articulating its desires. When it did not expressly provide a remedy, an
interpretation that Congress really intended to do so was obviously base-
less.
Nevertheless, the Kardon decision was grounded in sound reasoning,
if not in clear congressional intent.4 4 First, Judge Kirkpatrick noted that
under section 286 of the Restatement of Torts, when a statute is expressly
intended to protect a person or a class of persons of which the plaintiff
is a member and where the legislation provides a standard of conduct for
the benefit of the class, a civil remedy would merely further promote
that legislative purpose.45 Section 10(b) was intended to promote full
and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors, a class of persons which
included the plaintiff in Kardon.46
Secondly, the court noted that under section 29(b) of the 1934 Fed-
eral Securities Exchange Act "every contract made in violation of any
provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder ... shall be
void .... ,,4 If a contract in violation of a rule is to be void, the court
reasoned, Congress "almost necessarily implied a [civil] remedy in re-
spect of it."
4 8
While the overwhelming number of federal district courts and courts
of appeals support the Kardon construction of section 10(b), the Supreme
Court of the United States has not as yet explicitly decided the question.49
However, in 1964, the Court's decision in J.1. Case Co. v. Borak5° seemed
37. 15 U.S.C. § 77K(a) (1964).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77L(1) (1964).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77L(2) 1964).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1964).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1964).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964).
44. Practically every federal court of appeals has found an implied civil remedy. See
Klein, The Extension of a Private Remedy to Defrauded Securities Investors Under SEC
Rule 1OB-5, 20 U. Miwi L. REv. 81, 89 nn.40 & 41 (1965).
45. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916).
46. In Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) the Court stated that:
a disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results
in damage to one of a class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted, the
right to recover in damages ... is implied ....
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1964).
48. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
49. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States recently accepted a 1OB-5 case for
the first time. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 37 U.S.L.W. 4101 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1969).
However, the court was not required to decide whether there is a private right of action.
37 U.S.L.W. 4101, at 4105 n.9.
50. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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to settle the question temporarily. The Court was faced with a construc-
tion of section 14(a) 5' of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 14A-9, which
makes it "unlawful" for any person to solicit or permit the use of his
name to solicit any proxy. The petitioner argued that there was no pri-
vate implied civil remedy since Congress had made no special reference
to a private remedy under section 14(a). The Court, however, looked to
the purpose of the statute:
While this language makes no special reference to a private
right of action, among its chief purposes is the protection of
investors, which certainly implies the availability of judicial
relief where necessary to achieve that result. 2
A few courts have determined that since similar policy surrounds
section 10(b), the Court would apply an identical construction and imply
a private civil remedy. 53 However, regardless of the arguable implications
of 1.1. Case,5 4 it seems well-settled by the lower federal courts that civil
liability may be pursued under section 10(b)."
B. Florida Civil Liability
The Florida statute is also drawn in terms that it shall be "unlawful"
to engage in any of the prohibited acts or omissions. 6 Consequently, an
express provision is made for severe criminal liability for a violation of
the chapter.57 A fine of five thousand dollars and a sentence of five years
in the state penitentiary is possible. In addition, the Florida Securities
Commission may secure an injunction to restrain violations of the chap-
ter, including section 517.301."
However, unlike SEC Rule 1OB-5, the Florida law includes a number
of different types of express civil remedies. First, at the option of the
purchaser, every sale made in violation of section 517.301 may be voided.59
Damages may be recovered up to the purchase price plus costs and at-
torney's fees, upon tender of the securities to the seller. Recovery may
be made from any person in privity with the purchaser and every direc-
tor, officer, or agent of the seller. In effect, this section provides a recis-
sion of the sale, but only by the purchaser. It should be pointed out,
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964).
52. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
53. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1967). This con-
clusion seems well-founded. See The Treatment given in SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,
37 U.S.L.W. 4101 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1969): "This case presents none of the complications
which may arise in determining who, if anyone, may bring private actions under § 10(b)
and Rule lob-5. Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)." 37 U.S.L.W. 4101, at
4105 n.9.
54. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
55. See note 44 supra.
56. FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (1967).
57. FLA. STAT. § 517.302 (1967).
58. FLA. STAT. § 517.19 (1967).
59. FLA. STAT. § 517.21 (1967).
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however, that section 517.301 declares it unlawful to violate the provi-
sions of the section "in the sale or purchase of any security . . . ." There-
fore, it is clear that the express liability provision under section 517.21
does not include private recovery for the full spectrum of prohibited
activity under section 517.301.
The second major civil remedy provision is section 517.22, which
prevents other statutory or common law remedies to be obviated by the
express provisions in the securities act."° Conceivably, this section could
be interpreted as not precluding implied remedies promulgated, as in the
federal law, by judicial decision. However, the more reasonable interpre-
tation of the section is simply to prevent preemption by the act of other
causes of action.
Finally, the act provides that "the same civil remedies provided by
laws of the United States now or hereafter in force for the purchasers of
securities under any such laws ... shall extend also under this chapter." 1
It is clear from the wording of the section, however, that only legislative
promulgations are included in its purview. Thus, the contours of implied
civil remedy as shaped to the recent federal decisions are presumably not
within the penumbra of the section.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the Florida law.
First, express statutory civil remedies extend only to purchasers and only
against those directly involved in the sale of the securities. Secondly,
section 517.301 could be construed to provide a remedy against "any per-
son" who "directly or indirectly" violates its provisions. It is, therefore,
this second area of prohibited activity for which an implied or judicial
civil remedy must be found.
If an implied remedy was a difficult task under the federal statute,
that difficulty is magnified under the Florida legislation. It is clear that
a civil remedy was expressly intended by the legislature for purchasers
and not sellers. Under the ancient constructional maxim of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius,62 a remedy for sellers should be precluded. However,
Judge Kirkpatrick's answer in Kardon seems to refute this:
The argument is not without force. Were the whole question one
of statutory interpretation it might be convincing, but the ques-
tion is only partly such. It is whether an intention can be implied
to deny a remedy and to wipe out a liability which, normally, by
virtue of the basic principles of tort law accompanies the doing
of the prohibited act. Where, as here, the whole statute discloses
a broad purpose to regulate securities transactions of all kinds
and, as a part of such regulation, the specific section in question
60. FLA. STAT. § 517.22 (1967) provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall limit any statutory or common law right of any
person to bring any action in any court for any act involved in the sale of secu-
rities, or the right of the state to punish any person for any violation of any law.
61. FLA. STAT. § 517.23 (1967).
62. Literally translated, "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
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provides for the elimination of all manipulative or deceptive
methods in such transactions, the construction contended for by
the defendants may not be adopted. In other words, in view of
the general purpose of the Act, the mere omission of an express
provision for civil liability is not sufficient to negative what the
general law implies.68
Yet one could conceivably argue that the entire purpose of the act
is the protection of investors, who might be defined as purchasers rather
than sellers. Here again, the holding in Kardon is persuasive. An investor
need not be synonymous with a purchaser. Indeed, a seller may have just
as much stake in the full disclosure of material information as the pur-
chaser. To the extent that the purpose of the statute is designed to in-
clude protection for all investors, a seller should be included. Clearly, the
purpose of the federal enactment of section 10(b) was to extend the same
protection to sellers that purchasers were afforded under section 17 of
the 1933 Act.64 The Florida legislature could reasonably be interpreted as
having the same intent.
The ultimate question remaining, however, is whether other forms of
remedy are precluded in view of the express remedy for purchasers, i.e.,
recission. Here a better argument remains against an implied civil remedy
for purchasers. Under the federal acts there are no all-inclusive remedy
sections which expressly define what forms of action a potential litigant
may bring. Thus where the statutes do not provide for a civil remedy at
all, an implication of a remedy is entirely reasonable in view of the stat-
utes' broad remedial purposes. On the other hand, where, as in Florida,
an all-inclusive section expressly provides a remedy for "every sale made
in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter,"65 the clear intent
of the legislature is seen.
Thus, if the question is one of statutory construction, the Pandora's
Box of remedies potentially available to a purchaser by analogy to Rule
10B-5 is closed. If, however, as the authors believe, the question is rather
one of judicial remedy, close analogy to the federal decisions is reason-
able. In other words, where there is a legal injury there should be a legal
remedy. The mere fact that the legislature has failed to expressly provide
a particular form of remedy should not preclude a court from fashioning
a remedy, as long as it is consistent with the traditional kinds of remedies
known at the common law and is consistent with the legislative purpose.
As the Supreme Court of the United States observed in Deckert v. Inde-
pendence Shares Corp. :66
The power to enforce implies the power to make effective the
right of recovery afforded by the Act. And the power to make
63. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
64. Id.
65. FLA. STAT. § 517.21 (1967).
66. 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940).
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the right of recovery effective implies the power to utilize any
of the procedures or actions normally available to the litigant
according to the exigencies of the particular case.
Here, an implied civil remedy for a purchaser for damages is en-
tirely consistent with the aims of the act. Moreover, inasmuch as one of
the purposes of the statute is to force full disclosure, the remedy might
well extend beyond the immediate seller and the participating officer,
director or agent of the seller. The action could consistently be pursued
against "any person" who contravenes the statute.
The extension of this logic to the seller is simpler. Although a seller
is expressly included in section 517.301,67 no remedy is provided. A court
could well create a remedy without the fear of contravening express legis-
lative action.
Thus, in the absence of an amendment to the statute providing for
an expansive civil remedy to section 517.301, a Florida court would be
well-founded in both reasoning and precedent to create a civil remedy for
the section.
IV. THE ELEMENTS OF LIABILTY
A. Prohibited Acts or Omissions
The terms of SEC Rule 10B-5 and Florida Statutes, section 517.301,
superficially seem clear. Yet one of the most amazing legal phenomena
of recent times is the seemingly endless expansion of the statutory lan-
guage. The act's contours remain, therefore, undefined, and its furture
undetermined. While specific examples of prohibited conduct will be ad-
vanced below, it can be accurately generalized here that liability is im-
posed for a device or scheme to defraud, an untrue statement, a half-
truth, and non-disclosure. This conduct is prohibited notwithstanding the
fact that the securities or transactions are exempt from registration under
the respective securities acts. 8 Moreover, the plaintiff need not even al-
lege and prove common-law fraud; he must merely prove a misstatement
or omission. As one court stated:
Section 10(b) speaks in terms of the use of "any manipulative
device or contrivance" in contravention of rules and regulations
as might be prescribed by the Commission. It would have been
difficult to frame the authority to prescribe regulations in
broader terms. Had Congress intended to limit this authority to
regulations proscribing common-law fraud, it would have prob-
ably said so. We see no reason to go beyond the plain meaning
of the word "any" indicating that the use of manipulative or
deceptive devices or contrivances of whatever kind may be for-
67. FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (1967). See note 3 supra.
68. FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (1967). See note 3 supra.
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bidden, to construe the statute as if it had read "any fraudulent"
devices.6"
The demonstrated intent of legislatures, both national and state, is
to afford protection to the ordinary purchaser or seller of securities. Fraud
in this liberal sense may be accomplished by false statements, a failure
to correct a misleading impression left by statements already made, or by
not stating anything at all when there is a responsibility to come forward.
Thus scienter, which was a strict requirement at common law in cases of
fraud,7" is generally not required in Rule 1OB-5 actions7' and should not
be required in section 517.301 actions.
It should be noted that the deliberately broad language of both the
federal and state statutes allows a great amount of interpretation by the
courts, an opportunity which has been fully exploited by the federal jud-
iciary. Hence, new methods, plans and schemes may be effectively short-
circuited. The only real guidelines for the buyer, seller, corporation and
advising attorney is the avowed legislative purpose to equalize investment
protection through full disclosure by all parties of material information.
It is a policy of fundamental fairness.
B. Statement or Nondisclosure of Material Fact
Liability under SEC Rule 10B-5 and Florida Statutes, section
517.301, is imposed for the statement, misstatement, or non-statement of
a material fact.72 This is distinguished, as at the common law, from lia-
bility for the statement of a mere opinion.7 3 For example, a person who
falsely represents that ABC Corporation has acquired a number of assets
in order to induce a purchase of securities in ABC, Inc. will be subject to
liability under the Florida act. In addition, a person who represents that
ABC, Inc. has acquired a number of assets, but fails to disclose that the
assets are worthless in order to promote a sale of securities, should be
held liable for rescission.
These situations, each involving a clearly discernable fact, must be
distinguished from a mere opinion. A prediction, a theory, or an hypothe-
sis need not be disclosed.74 For example, assume that X, a director of
ABC, Inc., desires to sell a quantity of ABC stock. Assume further that
research taking place in the laboratories of ABC, Inc., if substantiated and
developed, would skyrocket the value of ABC, Inc. stock. As long as the
69. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
70. Derry v. Peek, (1889), 14 A.C. 337; W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 715 (3d ed.
1964).
71. See, e.g., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
72. FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (1967). See note 3 supra.
73. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) ; Cf. Nicewarncr v. Bleavins, 244
F. Supp. 261, 264 (D. Colo. 1965). See also Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for




research has not yet progressed beyond a mere theory, hypothesis or
opinion, X is under no duty to disclose the information.
Between fact on the one hand and opinion on the other, lies a zone
of legal uncertainty. When does a theory become a material fact? No
objective test can, at the present, be established. However, one might
presume that as the theory becomes verified, as the impact of the theory
on the plans and development of the corporation becomes more substan-




Cardozo's observation that "the assault upon the citadel of privity
is proceeding in these days apace""T applies with as much force to securi-
ties disclosure actions today as it did to the accountant's plight in 1931.
Section 517.301, like the federal section 10(b), imposes liability upon
any person who contravenes its provisions "directly or indirectly" in
connection with "the purchase or sale of any security."77 From this clear
wording, it appears that the reqiurement of privity of contract has been
abandoned.
It should be noted that most problems with regard to Florida cor-
porations will undoubtedly revolve around face to face transactions, and
thus privity will be satisfied. Nevertheless, problems involving others
not in privity (such as accountants) may be presented, where questions
regarding the requirement of privity would appropriately be raised.
Although strict privity of contract was not a requirement of common
law deceit,78 the federal courts had, until recently, imposed it upon plain-
tiffs suing under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10B-5. In Joseph v. Farns-
worth Radio and Television Corp.,7" the defendants sold shares of stock
to unknown third persons contemporaneously with the assertion of false
statements regarding the financial condition of the company. The plain-
tiffs, who did not buy directly from the defendants but purchased through
a national exchange, sued under federal section 10(b), seeking to recover
the loss they had suffered in selling their stock when the true facts were
publicized. The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted for lack of an allegation of privity. The court reasoned, how-
ever, that the requirement of privity could be substituted by a demonstra-
tion of reliance. This, "coupled with the possibility that later sales by the
individual defendants may form the basis of privity with these plaintiffs
dictate that a fair opportunity to explore such prospects should be
accorded . . .,,"
75. See A. BROMBERC, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD--SEC RULE 10B-5 § 5.3, at'97 (1967).
76. Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
77. FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (1967). See note 3 supra.
78. Palsey v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (1789).
79. 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
80. Id. at 706-707.
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However, in the absence of demonstrating reliance, the plaintiffs
cause was non-actionable:
A semblance of privity between the vendor and purchaser of
the security in connection with which the improper act, practice
or course of business was involved seems to be requisite and is
entirely lacking here.8
On appeal, The Second Circuit affirmed per curiam.82 Judge Frank dis-
sented from the decision, recognizing that one purpose of the act is to
extend common law liability for fraud to securities transactions. Since
even at common law there was no requirement of privity of contract in
an action for fraud, he reasoned that, a fortiori, privity should not be re-
quired under the statutes.8 3
The dissenting opinion was destined to prevail. In Miller v. Bargain
City, U.S.A., Inc.,84 for example, the court found difficulty with the con-
cept of a "semblance of privity":
[I]f "semblance of privity" means "privity" (like a little bit
pregnant), I reject it. The pattern of legislation in the securities
field following 1933 was designed to give the broadest protection
to investors....
... In my judgment, it would be an unwarranted constriction
of the broadest protection contemplated by the federal scheme
of securities legislation to engraft upon that scheme a require-
ment that is neither a part of the statute nor a part of the gov-
erning common law tort principles.
Thus, it seems clear that based on common law principles and anal-
ogizing to the federal construction, privity is not a requirement for liabil-
ity under section 517.301(l)(a) or (c). Subsection (1)(b), however,
creates a distinct problem. As distinguished from SEC Rule 10B-5, sec-
tion 517.301 (1)(b) has the additional wording "to obtain money or prop-
erty . . . ." by means of a prohibited act.85 This provision has great
ramifications upon the status of the potential defendant, since privity is
apparently necessary in order to invoke this subsection. Moreover, the
subsection is presumably aimed at face-to-face relationships. The word-
ing of the Florida section, which has been construed by the federal courts
as allowing an action for negligence,8 6 apparently also imposes a require-
ment of gain. This element, thought unnecessary by the federal courts,87
81. Id. at 706.
82. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
83. Id.
84. 229 F. Supp. 33, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
85. FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (1967). See note 3 supra.
86. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Royal
Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
87. See Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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significantly limits the potential liability which could be imposed under
subsection (1) (b).
D. Reliance and Causation
At the common law, the causal connection between the defendant's
wrongful conduct and the resulting damage to the plaintiff was demon-
strated by the inducement of the plaintiff to act or to refrain from act-
ing." The defendant's statement or non-statement must have been so
material and so substantial as to cause the plaintiff either to act or to
refrain from acting.89 If, however, the plaintiff made an investigation of
the facts for himself and then acted upon his own determination, the
causal connection was obviated.9 ° Yet the representation need not have
been the only cause; it is enough if it was a substantial factor in the plain-
tiff's decision. 91 Moreover, at common law, the complaining party who
allegedly relied on the representation of non-disclosure must have been
justified in his belief that the representation was true.92 In addition, he
must have also have been justified in taking action on the basis of the
representation. This latter requirement was stated in terms of "material-
ity," and was tested from an objective viewpoint.93 A demonstration of
materiality was required to prevent unjustified rescission by the plaintiff
and "some assurance that the representee was not merely using the mis-
representation as a pretext for escaping a bargain that he was dissatisfied
with on other grounds." '94
It is clear that with regard to common law liability for misrepresen-
tation, concepts of reliance, causation, and materiality merged, with each
taking on characteristics of the other. The main thrust of these require-
ments, however, was to insure that the wrongful act of the defendant was
either a substantial cause or the sole cause of the plaintiff's damage.
With regard to liability under section 10(b), Rule 10B-5, and section
517.301 of the Florida Statutes, the same definitional problem is pre-
sented. However, the problem is not as great with regard to section
517.301 as it is with respect to the federal section 10(b). Most of the
potential litigation under the Florida Statutes will come as a result of
problems with close corporations and face-to-face dealings. A causal re-
lationship between the defendant's act or omission and the plaintiff's dam-
age will be relatively easy to prove. On the other hand, with the nation-
wide trading of securities of giant corporations, federal litigation under
section 10(b) and Rule 1OB-5 does not lend itself to simple proof of caus-
88. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 729 (3d ed. 1964).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 83.
91. Id. at 730. See Anderson v. Handley, 149 Cal. App. 2d 184, 308 P.2d 368 (1957).
92. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 731 (3d ed. 1964).
93. Id. at 734.
94. Id. at 734; Keeton, Actionable Misrepresentation, 2 OKLA. L. Rv. 56, 59 (1949).
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ation or reliance. As one commentator has noted, "Requiring reliance is
likely to produce only a recital of pleading followed by 'I relied' testimony
from the plaintiff."9 Such testimony is difficult to substantiate in nation-
wide trading. For example, how may one prove that a plaintiff actually
relied on a false press release printed in the local newspaper to purchase
shares in a corporation?
Furthermore, courts which have dealt with problems of reliance,
causation, and materiality have frequently confused the terms.96 Some
form of reliance, however, has usually been thought of as necessary. In
Kohler v. Kohler Co.,9" for example, the plaintiffs brought an action to
recover damages for the sale of stock allegedly induced by misrepresenta-
tions, half truths, and omissions of the defendants. The court stated:
With regard to the element of reliance, although there is dicta
to the contrary, this element appears to be indispensable to the
cause of action . . . . Certainly it is reasonable to assume that
reliance is inherent in the concept of a breach of duty to dis-
close material information. If a plaintiff does not rely upon the
data he was furnished how can he say that the undisclosed data
was material or that the data he was furnished was "in light of
the circumstances misleading"? Absent proof of reliance, there
is no liability.
It would be an oversimplification, however, to state that reliance has
been required in all cases. Three categories may be distinguished: (1)
civil cases involving affirmative misrepresentation, (2) civil cases involv-
ing non-disclosure, and (3) cases seeking prophylactic or injunctive
relief.
In most cases involving affirmative misrepresentations, reliance is
both required and reasonable to prove. Courts have presumed reliance
from the type of transaction, materiality, or the relationship of the
parties.98 A difficult problem results, however, as the plaintiff is further
removed from direct contract with the affirmative misrepresentation.
Assume, for example, that X, an officer and director of ABC, Inc., mis-
represents a material fact. If the statement is released to the news media,
it may drastically affect the price of ABC stock. The plaintiff, either a
buyer or a seller, may have been damaged by the misstatement (through
fluctuation of the market price) even though he did not directly rely
on the statement and even if he was not aware of it. Here it would be
unreasonable to impose reliance as a requirement.9 9
95. A. BROMBERO, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD--SEC RULE 1OB-S § 8.6(2), at 211 (1967).
96. Id.
97. 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
98. See A. BROMBERO, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5 § 8.6(1), at 212
(1967); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
99. See Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 658 at 672 (1969); See also A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES
LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 1OB-5 § 8.6(2), at 212 (1967): "If the misstatement does not come
to plaintiff's attention, or can easily happen in open market trades, it would be meaningless
to demand reliance."
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With regard to non-disclosure cases, a requirement of reliance is
unreasonable.' ° In List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 01 for example, the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York imposed a require-
ment of active reliance on the defendant's silence. On appeal, the Second
Circuit reconstituted the concept of reliance, stating, "The proper test
is whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than
he did if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact."'
01 2
It is submitted, however, that even in non-disclosure cases, affirma-
tive reliance may be demonstrated directly or indirectly. For example,
assume that the directors of ABC Corporation, amid wide-spread rumors
of a new material development, fail to disclose the information while they
buy additional shares in ABC, Inc. Mr. P, who knows nothing of the
non-disclosure, sells his stock at $18 per share. Two days later, the
rumors are substantiated by ABC, Inc., and the value of the stock sky-
rockets to $76 per share. Mr. P has never relied on the non-disclosure,
but has he not been injured? Had the material information been dis-
closed, he would not have sold. The injury to him was undoubtedly
caused by the non-disclosure, but there has been no direct, affirmative
reliance. One commentator has suggested that in cases of affirmative re-
liance involving market price fluctuation, resort may be had to a concept
of indirect reliance.' 0 3 Whether this concept could be applied to non-
disclosure is open to question.
With regard to injunctive relief, a requirement of reliance is not
appropriate. In such situations, it is not the injury to a particular investor
which is litigated, but the potential danger to the entire public as a result
of the prohibited conduct. No real causal relationship need be shown,
therefore, and this requirement has not been implied by the courts or
even discussed. The concept of reliance in injunctive relief cases is pre-
empted by a requirement of materiality."0 4
It is submitted that reliance will be a necessary requirement in civil
cases under section 517.301 of the Florida Statutes, at least in close
corporation cases.
E. Insider Trading
1. DEFINITION OF "INSIDER"
Implied civil liability under section 10(b), SEC Rule 10B-5, and,
hence, section 517.301 includes by its sweeping terms "any person" who
100. See A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD--SEC RULE 10B-5 § 8.6(1), at 209
(1967): "In nondisclosure cases, reliance has little if any rational role." However, in direct-
dealing nondisclosure cases, reliance has been required. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp.
808, 828 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
101. 227 F. Supp. 906, 911-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
102. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965).
103. A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAuD-SEC RULE 10B-5 § 8.6(2), at 212 (1967).
104. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
See also Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
473 (1967).
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engages in the prohibited conduct. Traditionally, this has included offi-
cers and directors.05 Recently, the courts have indulged in extending the
statute to include persons designated as "insiders."' °6
The status of insider is not predicated upon a particular corporate
position, such as officer, director, or shareholder. Being an insider is rather
a state of mind, or possession of knowledge of material information not
generally disclosed:
Anyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public or if he is disabled from dis-
closing in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses
not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the
securities concerned while such inside information remains un-
disclosed. °7
This rather unique pronouncement is a major conclusion of the
now infamous case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur.08 During the first
week of November, 1963, the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company was involved
in drilling test sites around Timmins, Ontario. On November 12th, the
company discovered large ore deposits, one of the greatest mineral
deposits in recent history. Although measures were taken to conceal the
discovery, rumors began to spread about the find; and on April 12, 1964,
Texas Gulf Sulphur issued a press release labeling the rumors unfounded
and "premature."' 0 Four days later, a decidedly contrary statement was
made at a news conference where the company disclosed that the company
had made a major find of approximately 25 million tons of ore."0
In the preliminary litigation, the SEC alleged that immediately
following the preliminary find, company officials and others who were
benefited with the information purchased a number of shares, "calls,"
and options to purchase at a low price.' At the time the strike was dis-
covered, Texas Gulf Sulphur was selling for $17 per share. At the time of
the final news release, the price had gone up to $58 a share. Finally, at
the time the SEC instituted suit, Texas Gulf Sulphur was selling for $71
per share."
2
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York
105. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
106. See Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and
Disclosure Obligations Under Rule 1OB-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 809 (1968); Wortsman, The
Insider: A Survey in Corporate Disclosure, 25 FAC. L. REV. 55 (1967); Comment, Insider
Liabilities Examined, 18 SYRAcusE L. REV. 808 (1967).
107. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). See Fleischer,
Securities Trading and Corporation Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1278-80 (1965).
108. 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968).
109. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 845 (2d Cir. 1968).
110. Id. at 846.
111. Id. at 839, 840.
112. Id. at 847.
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dismissed the complaint as to eleven of the thirteen defendants.' On
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of the district court
and remanded it for further proceedings consistent with its opinion." 4 It
is the revolutionary impact of the court's opinion which has created such
a stir in the legal and financial communities.
In one sweeping decision, the court eliminated a basic economic
reality of major corporations:
Our decision to expand the limited protection afforded outside
investors by the trial court's narrow definition of materiality
is not at all shaken by fears that the elimination of insider
trading benefits will deplete the ranks of capable corporate
managers by taking away an incentive to accept such employ-
ment. Such benefits, in essence, are forms of secret corporate
compensation ...."',
The benefits of insider trading, in the court's opinion, are derived at
the expense of the uninformed investing public and not at the expense of
the corporation.1 6 The insiders with knowledge of the developments in
Texas Gulf Sulphur were not trading on an equal basis with the outside
investors. They alone were reasonably sure of the effect of the informa-
tion they had received. "Such inequities based upon unequal access to
knowledge should not be shrugged off as inevitable in our way of life, or,
in view of the congressional concern in the area, remain uncorrected."""
The legislative purpose, both at the state and national level, is to afford
all investors the equal information necessary for participation in securities
transactions. This purpose is not limited by the distance the insider is
from the immediate transaction or from the original source of the in-
formation. Thus a person who is given information by an insider becomes,
as a "tippee," an insider himself.118 Although the court of appeals was not
113. Id. at 842, 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
114. 401 F.2d at 842, 843.
115. Id. at 851. See Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 408,
409-10 (1962).
116. 401 F.2d at 851. See SEC, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 50 (1944). The court in Texas
Gulf Sulphur observed that "Congress intended by the Exchange Act to eliminate the idea
that the use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of
corporate office." 401 F.2d at 848, n.9 (1968).
117. 401 F.2d at 852:
It was the intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should be
subject to identical market risks,--which market risks include, of course the risk
that one's evaluative capacity or one's capital available to put at risk may exceed
another's capacity or capital. The insiders here were not trading on an equal footing
with the outside investors. They alone were in a position to evaluate the probability
and magnitude of what seemed from the outset to be a major ore strike; they
alone could invest safely, secure in the expectation that the price of TGS stock
would rise substantially in the event such a major strike should materialize, but
would decline little, if at all, in the event of failure, for the public, ignorant at
the outset of the favorable probabilities would likewise be unaware of the un-
productive exploration, and the additional exploration costs would not significantly
affect TGS market prices.
118. Id.
1969]
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required to discuss the problem, it noted that such trading by tippee in-
siders "certainly could be equally reprehensible."" 9
2. THE TEST OF MATERIALITY
An insider, the court stated, has a duty to disclose information in
"those situations which are essentially extraordinary in nature and which
are reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of
the security if [the extraordinary situation is] disclosed." ' The basic
test of materiality is whether a reasonable man would attach importance
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.'
Analyzed from an objective viewpoint, the question is whether a fact in
"reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the
corporation's securities." '122 The appellate court took issue with the trial
court's application of the facts to the test of materiality. The district
court had held that the results of the first drill core were too remote to
have any material impact on the market price of Texas Gulf Sulphur
stock. 23 The court of appeals, however, felt that knowledge of the results
of the discovery would have been important to a reasonable investor and
might have affected the price of the stock. 24 Knowledge of the great
potentialities of the find were, in the court's opinion, more than mar-
ginal.
1 -25
Indeed, a major factor affecting the court's consideration was the
119. Id.
120. Id. at 848. See Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices:
The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1289 (1965).
121. 401 F.2d at 849; see List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965),
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 538(2) (a); accord, W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 554-55 (3d ed.
1964). Under Florida common law, a fact is material when it substantially affects the inter-
ests of the litigant. Generally, the test is whether, but for the perpetration of the fraud, the
allegedly aggrieved party would have refused to enter into the transaction. See Morris v.
Ingraffia, 154 Fla. 432, 18 So.2d 1 (1944) ; Hart v. Marbury, 82 Fla. 317, 90 So. 173 (1921).
122. 401 F.2d at 849; List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
123. 401 F.2d at 849 n.1l:
We are not, of course, bound by the trial court's determination as to materiality
unless we find it "clearly erroneous" for that standard of appellate review is
applicable only to issues of basic fact and not to issues of ultimate fact.
See Baranow v. Gibraltar Factors Corp., 366 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir. 1966); Mamiye Bros.
v. Barber S.S. Lines, Inc., 360 F.2d 774, 776-78 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 835
(1966); see also SEC v. R.A. Holman & Co., 366 F.2d 456, 457-58 (2d Cir. 1966) (by
implication).
124. 401 F.2d at 850 n.12:
We do not suggest that material facts must be disclosed immediately; the timing of
disclosure is a matter for the business judgment of the corporate officers entrusted
with the management of the corporation within the affirmative disclosure require-
ments promulgated by the exchanges and the SEC. Here, a valuable corporate
purpose was served by delaying the publication of the K-55-1 discovery. We do
intend to convey, however, that where a corporate purpose is thus served by with-
holding the news of a material fact, those persons who are thus quite properly
true to their corporate trust must not during the period of non-disclosure deal per-
sonally in the corporation's securities or give to outsiders confidential information
not generally available to all the corporations' stockholders and to the public at
large. (Emphasis added.)
125. Id. at 849-50.
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importance attached to the drilling results by those who had insider infor-
mation. The purchase of short-terms calls, in some cases by persons who
had never before purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur stock, helped the court
infer that these persons were definitely influenced by the drilling re-
sults.' 26 Outside investors with the same inside information would, in
objective contemplation, have been just as influenced. 27
3. TIMING OF DISCLOSURE
Assuming that the information is objectively material, the matter
of timing of disclosure is left to the reasonable judgment of the corporate
officers. Thus, if there is a reasonable and valuable corporate purpose
which can be served by withholding the material information, this alone
does not constitute a breach of the statutes.12 This is distinct from the
prohibition that material information may not be used by insiders to deal
personally in the corporation's securities or be given to "tippees" to
indulge in trading.
1 29
An individual possessing material inside information will become
liable under Rule 10B-5 and Florida Statutes section 517.301 at the time
that he places an order to trade in the corporate securities in advance of
general public or outsider knowledge. This was distinguished by the
Texas Gulf Sulphur court from the time of ultimate execution of an
order.3 ° Insiders are thus discouraged from "beating the news" by re-
questing that their orders be executed immediately after a news release is
distributed, but before outsiders can act on the disclosed information.'
Apparently, the test considered by the court most consistent with
the congressional purpose is the "Dow-Jones" test. That is, an insider
must wait until "the news could reasonably have been expected to appear
over the media of widest circulation, the Dow-Jones broad tape.'
3 2 Of
course, this test applies solely to 'those securities which might appear on
the Dow-Jones tape. It will require another case to determine the test
for securities of a smaller corporation. It is relatively clear, however, that
126. Id. at 851.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 850 n.12.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 853 n.17:
The effective protection of the public from insider exploitation of advance notice
of material information requires that the time that an insider places an order rather
than the time of its ultimate execution, be determinative for Rule 1OB-5 purposes.
Otherwise, insiders would be able to "beat the news" by requesting in advance that
their orders be executed immediately after the dissemination of a major news
release but before outsiders could act on the release.
131. Id. at 854:
Before insiders may act upon material information, such information must have
been effectively. disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure its availability to the
investing public. Particularly here, where a formal announcement to the entire
financial news media had been promised in a prior official release known to the
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the courts are concerned with dissemination of the information to the
public. Therefore, regardless of the media, insiders desiring to trade will
have to wait until the information could reasonably be expected to reach
the general investing public. In the case of a close corporation, insiders
apparently will have to disclose material information to the shareholders
before attempting to enter into the purchase or sale of corporate secur-
ities.
Questions naturally arise as to the application of such a test. For
example, if an insider may act as soon as the information is transmitted
or published does he nevertheless have an advantage? Most investors
will need varying amounts of time to assimilate and analyze the infor-
mation disclosed. An insider who already realizes the potential ramifica-
tions of some development will be able to act more quickly than out-
siders, even though he does not literally "beat the news." On the other
hand, if an arbitrary time limit for assimilation is set, the insider will be
put at a decided disadvantage. A speculator will be able to act on the
development faster than the insider. No clear ideal test seems possible
which is fair to all parties concerned. It is submitted, nevertheless, that
the test adopted by the court in Texas Gulf Sulphur is unclear and im-
practical.
4. PURCHASE OR SALE UNNECESSARY
Broadly construing the legislative purpose underlying section 10(b)
and Rule 10B-5, the court of appeals in Texas Gulf Sulphur held that
when Congress used the phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security" it
intended only that the device employed, whatever it might be,
be of a sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely
thereon, and, in connection therewith, so relying, cause them to
purchase or sell a corporation's securities. 83
Thus, whether an insider has a wrongful motive is irrelevant to his
liability. Moreover, the fact that an insider does not engage in a securities
transaction does not negate the possibility of wrongful purpose:
We do not believe that Congress intended that the proscriptions
of the Act would not be violated unless the makers of a mis-
leading statement also participated in pertinent securities trans-
actions in connection therewith, or unless it could be shown that
the issuance of the statement was motivated by a plan to benefit
the corporation or themselves at the expense of a duped invest-
ing public.
8 4
Rule 1OB-5 and, therefore, Florida Statutes section 517.301 are
violated whenever assertions are made in a manner reasonably calculated
133. Id. at 860.
134. Id.
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to influence the investing public if such assertions are false or misleading
or are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of whether the statement,
half truth, or omission was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior
purposes. However, "if corporate management demonstrates that it was
diligent in ascertaining that the information it published was the whole
truth and that such diligently obtained information was disseminated in
good faith, Rule 1OB-5 would not have been violated." 'l1
5. NEGLIGENCE
Noting that proof of a specific intent to defraud is unnecessary in
both SEC enforcement and private actions, the court in Texas Gulf Sul-
phur extended this to include an action for negligent misstatements. The
court observed that just as the standard for deceptive conduct has been
modified in enforcement proceedings, such as injunction petitions,1s6 it
has likewise been modified in private litigation. Thus, negligent insider
conduct has become both unlawful and actionable. 7
The opinion implied that there was no congressional intention to
require specific fraudulent intent. Indeed, the court observed that the
securities laws should be interpreted as an expansion rather than a con-
striction of the common law, in order to effectuate the broad remedial
purposes of the legislation:
Moreover, a review of other sections of the act from which Rule
10B-S seems to have been drawn suggests that the implementa-
tion of a standard of conduct that encompasses negligence as
well as active fraud comports with the administrative and the
legislative purpose underlying the Rule."8
135. Id. at 862.
136. See Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1963); SEC v. Capital Gains
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
137. See, e.g., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Royal Air Properties,
Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) ;
Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). But see Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242
F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
138. 401 F.2d at 855 n.22:
Liability under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2), the lan-
guage of which is strikingly similar to that of 1OB-5 (2), attaches from the mere
fact of misrepresentation or misleading omission unless defendant proves that 'he did
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such
untruth or omission.' The provisions of Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) and (3), which are virtually identical to the
provisions of Rule 1OB-5(2) and (3) and were, in fact, the model therefor, see
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956, 72 S. Ct. 1051, 96 L.Ed. 1356 (1952); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec.
Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 n.4 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814, 81 S. Ct.
695, 5 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1961), apply criminal penalties to sellers only (Rule 10B-5
was promulgated to fill this gap in enforcement, SEC Ann. Rep. 10 (1942)), and
have been read, upon close scrutiny of their legislative history, as not requiring
specific fraudulent intent, SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181, at 184-186 (7th Cir.
1966); United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1962) (lack of dili-
gence is all that is required for conviction in a criminal prosecution for violation
of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act.)
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The court recognized that even constructive fraud has been expanded
from recklessness to include non-reckless negligent misrepresentation.
Utilizing a rather questionable distinction, the court attempted to recon-
cile its decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur with its 1967 decision in Barnes v.
Osofsky.' 9 In Barnes "some form of the traditional scienter requirement"
was held necessary. 4 ° Twisting somewhat the definition of "scienter," the
court equated it with "lack of dilligence, constructive fraud, or un-
reasonable or negligent conduct . *. .. "I' The dominant consideration in
the court's reasoning is the congressional purpose of investor protection;
"the investing public may be injured as much by one's misleading state-
ment containing inaccuracies caused by negligence as by a misleading
statement published intentionally to further a wrongful purpose."' 4
The decision and authority in this area are not clear. First, the
language aid intent of the statute seems to require a showing of some
specific fraudulent intent. Secondly, the requirement of scienter, while
modified somewhat in the common law, is still equated with some element
of the knowledge of the falsity. 4 , Thirdly, the position of the court that
imposition of liability for negligence is consistent with congressional
design seems equally unfounded. 4 4 Were negligence to be imposed with
a duty owed to a particular person or a clearly defineable class, negligent
misstatements or omissions would be actionable. However, when the class
of persons may be unlimited and when the plaintiffs are, in effect, "un-
foreseeable," liability for negligence would be unrealistic.
The problem with a cause of action for negligence in this area is
not so much the negligent act as it is the limitation of liability. A person
may not be negligent to the world. Thus, the court's implication in Texas
Gulf Sulphur is revolutionary. An insider in a large corporation could be
liable to several hundreds of thousands of investors, and damages could
be millions of dollars, simply for a negligent misstatement.
Judge Cardozo in Ultramares v. Touche'45 was concerned with this
139. 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
140. Id. at 272.
141. 401 F.2d at 855. See Note, 63 Micir. L. REV. 1070, 1075, 1076 n.29 (1965) ; Note,
32 U. CmI. L. REV. 824, 832 n.36 (1965). See also Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d
Cir. 1968):
If some form of scienter test is to be applied, as Judge Friendly seems to suggest in
his concurring opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur, we think the alternative allegation of
actual knowledge of falsity is amply sufficient as a matter of pleading. And this
would seem to be so whether the scienter test ultimately applied be strict or liberal.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (2) ; Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21,
28-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Michael v. Clark Equipment Co. et al, 380 F.2d 351, 352
(2d Cir. 1967).
142. 401 F.2d at 860.
143. At least in private actions. See Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Parker v. Baltimore Paint and Chemical Corp., 244 F. Supp. 267 (D. Colo. 1965).
Bromberg quite correctly points out that the trend is against requiring scienter. A. BROM-
BERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAU--SEC RULE 10B-5 § 2.6(1), at 50 (1967).
144. Indeed, the Congressional design, to protect investors from overreaching by in-
siders, is inconsistent with merely negligent omissions. Nor does the court point to any
Congressional intent in favor of liability for negligence.
145. 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931). See also Investment Corporation of
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problem when he refused to hold an accountant liable for a negligent mis-
representation. To do so, he reasoned, would in effect make the accoun-
tant liable to an unforeseeable class of persons:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of
deceptive entries may expose accountants to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeter-
minate class.
More recently, in Hedley Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners,
Ltd.,146 A bank inquired of B bank concerning the financial position of a
customer of bank B. Bank B negligently replied that the customer was in
a sound financial position. Later, the customer went bankrupt, and bank
A was injured by the statement. The court held that a cause of action for
negligence against bank B was stated. This situation, however, is dis-
tinguishable from that of a large corporation. In Hedley Byrne, not only
were the plaintiffs forseeable, they were also quite limited. In a large
corporation, the plaintiffs are both unforseeable and unlimited.
In a close corporation, imposition of liability for negligence under
section 517.301 (1) (b) would not be as unreasonable as the same liability
in a large public corporation. Generally, the class of persons to whom the
insiders owe a duty in a close corporation are both forseeable and limited.
Thus, under section 517.301 of the Florida Statutes and section 10(b) of
the 1934 Federal Securities Exchange Act, liability for negligence could
be judicially constructed. However, it is submitted that the common law
tests which exist with respect to the limitation of the scope of liability
will have to be applied. Thus, the question for the court will not be
whether the insider was in fact negligent, but rather the extent of his
liability.
It should be made clear, however, that in the authors' opinion im-
position of liability for negligence should not be a matter of judicial
statutory construction. There is no indication that either Congress or
the Florida Legislature intended an insider to be liable for a negligent
act. Until such time as the legislative bodies reach a clear decision on
the subject, the courts should not venture into such an uncharted area.
The results could be not only inconsistent with the purpose of the legisla-
tion, but devastating to the financial community.
V. DAMAGES
The obvious available remedy for purchasers is rescission under
section 517.21 of the Florida Statutes.14 7 Under section 517.301, however,
the defrauded buyer will undoubtedly be able to secure the purchase
Florida v. Buchman, 208 So.2d 291 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968); Note, 23 U. ML~mI L. REV. 256
(1968).
146. [19641 A.C. 465 (1963), 2 All E.R. 575.
147. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
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price, even though he does not rely on section 517.21. Alternatively, a
defrauded buyer could keep the securities and recover the difference be-
tween the price paid and the actual value when purchased.148
A question may arise as to the conflict between sections 517.21 and
517.301. Section 517.21 provides, in part, that:
No purchaser otherwise entitled shall claim or have the benefit
of this section who shall have refused or failed within thirty
days from the date thereof to accept an offer in writing of the
seller to take back the security in question.
Assume that the purchaser learns of the misrepresentation after thirty
days and after the seller has tendered the purchase price. May he now
bring an action under 517.301 seeking, not a formal recission under
section 517.21, but the difference between the purchase price and the real
value? Such a question should be resolved, the authors submit, in favor
of the maintenance of the action after fraud has been discovered, regard-
less of the exhaustion of the thirty-day period.
The defrauded seller is in a better position under the federal deci-
sions. The courts have implied a constructive trust giving the seller what-
ever profits have been made by the buyer on resale.'49 In several cases,
however, the measure employed has been the difference between the price
at sale and the real value at the time of the sale. 5 °
In the case of both the defrauded seller and the defrauded buyer,
allegations and proof of the scienter may not provide the basis for punitive
damages. 5'
Substantial difficulties may be encountered in measuring damages
in a case involving a Florida close corporation. The reference point for
damages is not as reliable as the market value in actively traded publicly
held securities.152 The question, of course, will be one for a jury; and
from an evidentiary viewpoint, proof of real value will be exceedingly
difficult.'53
VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Federal
An action brought under the federal section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is governed by the state statute of limitations.'54
148. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (lst Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965); Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
149. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
150. See, e.g., Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345, 364-65 (D.N.J. 1966).
151. Green v. Wolf Corporation, CCH FED. SEC. REP. ff 92,321, p. 97, 497, at 97, 505
(2d Cir. 1968): "Punitive damages are not authorized in private actions under § 10(b) and
Rule l0b-5."
152. See A. BROMBERC, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD--SEC RULE 10B-5 § 9.1, at 228 (1967).
153. For an article dealing with the measure of damages under Rule 10B-5 see Com-
ment, Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under Rule 10B-5, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q.
165.
154. See Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ; A. BROMBERG, SECURITrES
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However, when the state has a number of limitations statutes which
might be applicable, the federal court may decide which statute applies.
Thus, in Charney v. Thomas,155 the court indicated that if a state statute
contained a provision similar to section 10(b) with a limitations period,
it would apply that state limitation to the federal action. This was based
on the reasoning that the decision as to limitations should fall upon the
state statute that best effectuates the federal policy.
In Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 56 a complaint was filed in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida under section
10(b) and SEC Rule 1OB-5. A motion for summary judgment by the
defendant on the grounds that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations was granted. In so holding, the court said that either Florida
statutes, section 95.11(5)(a), 57 relating to liabilities created by statute,
or section 95.11(5) (d),'s relating to fraudulent acts, could apply to bar
a federal action not brought within three years.
B. Florida
There are a number of potential state limitations which could apply
to actions growing out of a violation of Florida Statutes section 517.301.
Section 517.21, which provides for a rescission of every sale made in
violation of chapter 517, provides that "no action shall be brought for the
recovery of the purchase price after two years from the date of such
sale . .. .
For criminal liability, the limitation on prosecution of offenses com-
mitted in violation of the chapter is five years.' 59
Under subsection (1)(a) and (1)(c) of 517.301, which imposes
liability for some form of fraud, analogy may be made to section 95.11
(5) (d) of the Florida Statutes. That section limits actions for relief on
the ground of fraud to three years. 60 Additionally, the cause of action is
not deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of
the facts constituting the fraud.'
Finally, section 95.11(5) (a) provides for a three-year limitation
LAW: FRAuD-SEC RuLE 1OB-5 § 2.5, at 41 n.105 (1967); Schulman, Statutes of Limita-
tion in 1OB-5 Actions, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 635 (1967).
155. 372 F.2d 97, 99-100 (6th Cir. 1967).
156. 246 F. Supp. 780, 781-84 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
157. Actions other than those for the recovery of real property can only be com-
menced as follows:
(5) Within three years.-
(a) An action upon a liability created by statute other than a penalty or for-
feiture ....
158. (5) Within three years.-
(d) an action for relief on the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case
not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the
facts constituting the fraud . ...
159. FLA. STAT. § 517.302 (1967).
160. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(5)(d) (1967). See note 158 supra.
161. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(5)(d) (1967). See note 158 supra.
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upon an action for "liability created by statute, other than penalty or
forfeiture." This limitation seems appropriate for section 517.301 (1) (b),
which may provide liability for negligence. However, strict observance of
the words "liability created by statute" may cause confusion for the
courts, since liability for negligence is probably not created by statute
but rather by judicial decision. If the courts do imply a cause of action
for negligence under section 517.301(1)(b), then section 95.11(4) will
operate to limit the action. This three-year limitation applies to "any
action not specifically provided for in this chapter."
The statute of limitation for an action of rescission (two years)
preempts the general statute of limitations (three years). In Fowler v.
Matheny,'62 the plaintiffs filed a suit for rescission claiming that bonds
were fraudulently sold to them in violation of the Florida securities laws.
Notwithstanding this allegation, the court held that Florida Statutes
section 95.11(5) (d) is not applicable to an action for rescission even
though fraud is involved.
The question of the tolling of the statute of limitations seems clear.
In Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat,13 the court construed section 95.11 (5)
(d), which provides that the statute is not tolled until "discovery by
the aggrieved party" of the facts constituting the fraud. The plaintiff
contended that this should be construed to mean actual discovery, mea-
sured by a subjective standard. The defendant contended that the court
should adopt an objective standard, namely, whether the litigant, in the
exercise of due diligence, could have discovered the facts. Holding for
the defendant, the court drew on both Florida state decisions and federal
decisions and concluded:
The word discovery as used in the statute must be determined
by an objective, not subjective standard. It has been uniformly
interpreted as measuring knowledge of acts which could have
been discovered in the exercise of due diligence.'
Limitation-hunting may afford one a welcome diversion, but it does
not make for cohesive enforcement. It is submitted here, and will be
suggested again below, that a statute of limitations should be added to
section 517.301. In addition, the tolling of the statute should take place
as of the time of the discovery of the material misstatements, or when
such act or omission should reasonably have been discovered.
VII. DEFENSES
If there is one non-complex area in potential section 517.301 liability,
it is in the area of defenses. Beyond a few paltry shields, there are none.
Although counsel may argue for a judicial interpretation requiring an
162. 184 So.2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
163. 246 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
164. Id. at 783.
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element of scienter, privity, or reliance, litigants will probably be suc-
cessful only in the area of reliance. A good defense to any claim of mis-
representation, either fraudulent or negligent, is undoubtedly unjustified
reliance. In the area of liability for negligence, counsel may also wish to
argue the proximity of the cause to the injury, and in the present status
of the law counsel may effectively argue that the implied civil remedy is
inappropriate.
Of course, the usual dilatory tactics may be invoked, as well as
laches, unclean hands, waiver, estoppel and limitations. 15
IX. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 517.301 LIABILITY
Civil liability under section 517.301 has drastic economic ramifica-
tions. Undoubtedly, the greatest effect will be in the area of liability in-
surance for officers, directors, and accountants. Federal actions against
insiders and others connected with the unlawful purchase or sale of
securities have already resulted in untold millions of dollars in damages.' 66
The recovery sought in Fischer v. Kletz 67 against a national accounting
firm well exceeded the amount demanded in any other case of its kind.
Thus, as potential liability for accountants increases, the fees for auditing
and certifying financial statements will, in all likelihood, increase pro-
portionately.
The strict disclosure requirements construed as necessary under
Rule 1OB-5 and therefore also under section 517.301 will obviously be
expensive to Florida corporations. This will naturally affect the cost of
proposed business transactions and therefore impinge greatly upon the
flexibility which small corporations have heretofore enjoyed.
Corporations which have been operating without the benefit of
counsel will now be well-advised to seek the guidance of an attorney in
this specialized and rapidly developing field. Moreover, general practi-
tioners will be forced to rely upon their more knowledgeable brethren as
Rule 1OB-5 and section 517.301 liability expands further.
Finally, the Texas Gulf Sulphur case demonstrates that at least one
area of secret corporate compensation is foreclosed. 6 Officers and di-
rectors no longer will be able to act and trade on developments and trans-
actions not otherwise available to other investors or shareholders.
When weighed against the benefits to be obtained, i.e., full and fair
disclosure for all investors, civil liability under section 517.301 is not
unreasonable. This is not to say, however, that the Florida courts should
165. See A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAuD-SEC RULE 10B-5 § 11.5, at 253
(1967).
166. See Ruder, Corporate Disclosure Required by the Federal Securities Laws: The
Codification Implications of Texas Gull Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 872 (1967).
167. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See Note, Common Law Deceit: Accountants'
Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933; Implied Civil Liability Under
Rule lOB-5, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 181 (1967).
168. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
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adopt the construction of Rule 10B-5 by the federal courts in total. Some
of the decisions are both unreasonable and dangerous to a dynamic
financial structure; while, on the other hand, some of the decisions have
been long overdue. The Florida courts have a unique opportunity to make
reasoned choices based on the hindsight and experience of another judicial
system.
IX. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that a considerable
amount of judicial "construction" of SEC Rule 10B-5 has expanded the
original scope of the statute beyond the realm of reasonableness. It could
also be fairly observed that, despite judicial protestations to the contrary,
Rule 1OB-5 does not conform to original intent. The statute, therefore,
is basically a product of legislation by both the judiciary and the ad-
ministrative body. The authors submit that such activity is not only
dangerous to the basic tripartite form of government we presently enjoy,
but is also dangerous to the realities of economics in a basically capital-
istic structure.
Legislation by legislative bodies is a function of deliberation by
representative factions of all the necessary data, argumentation, and
policy considerations which combine to make sound political judgments.
These decisions are, for the most part, not made in a chamber, isolated
from the practicalities and realistic application of law to the economy.
They take into account the impact of liability upon the financial com-
munity. They are not merely responsive to a single litigant seeking a
remedy.
The judiciary, which has neither the tools, nor the expertise, nor
the economic sensitivity to balance conflicting public interests, has in-
truded into an arena for which it is embarrassingly unprepared. It is
one thing to devise a test for the "materiality" of a particular event. It is
quite another to devise an action for negligence when there is none, and
when none was intended. Such judicial contortions not only add con-
fusion but also detract reason from clear legislative mandate.
The judicial creations in the guise of Rule 1OB-5 has had an un-
precedented negative impact on the financial community at the federal
level. Section 517.301 of the Florida Statutes need not meet the same
fate. While analogy to the federal construction is certainly warranted at
the present time, the authors submit that a number of amendments might
restrict judicial expansion where there is an absence of clear legislative
intent.
A. Civil Liability
It is submitted that a provision should be included in section 517.301
granting a private civil remedy for a violation of any of its provisions.
Legislative sanction of such a remedy must be clear to be effective. Thus,
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if the opinion of the Florida Legislature is that section 517.301 should
be limited merely to criminal or administrative sanctions, it should be
more clearly articulated. On the other hand, if, as the authors urge, a
private remedy is justified, the provision should be included.
B. Privity
The provision "to obtain money or property .... " in subsection
(1)(b) of section 517.301 should be deleted. The clause is not a part of
the Uniform Securities Act and was taken from section 17(a) of the
Federal Securities Act of 1933. However, section 17(a) is limited solely
to recovery by purchasers. Since section 517.301 is not limited to pur-
chasers, the above-mentioned provision is contradictory and confusing.
Moreover, subsection (1) (b) as it is presently drafted adds an inappro-
priate requirement of privity. Since privity is not required in common-
law fraud or deceit actions, it is, in view of the statutory purpose, out of
place in section 517.301.
C. Offer
The Uniform Securities Act, the Federal Securities Act of 1933, and
the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 each include in their re-
spective fraud provisions a prohibition, not only of a fraudulent purchase
or sale, but also of a fraudulent offer. The Florida Securities Act, of
course, includes "offer" in the general definition of "sale." However, to
avoid confusion, the Legislature would be well advised to include the
term "offer" in the introductory paragraph of section 517.301.
D. Act
Rule 1OB-5 prohibits any "act, practice, or course of business . . .
which involves a material misstatement. The Florida counterpart, like
section 17(a) of the Federal Securities Act of 1933, merely prohibits a
"transaction, practice, or course of business .... The difference in word-
ing may be crucial. Under Rule 1OB-5, a fraudulent act, regardless of
whether there is privity or an actual business transaction, is prohibited.
Thus, under the federal rule, a fraudulent act by an accountant is pro-
hibited, although he does not engage in a business transaction with a pur-
chaser or seller. It is questionable whether, under the present Florida
statute, the same construction would be obtained. While some lexicog-
raphers may define "transaction" to include any single act, it could be
easily misconstrued to mean a business series of acts. It is, therefore,
urged that the word "act" be substituted for "transaction."
E. Silence
Section 517.301(1)(b), like SEC Rule 10B-5, is not clear in its
proscription of fraudulent silence. The clause which prohibits the "omis-
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sion to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made not misleading. . . ." could be construed to prohibit half-truths, but
not fraudulent silence. Therefore, the subsection should be amended to
read "to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact."
F. Fraud
It is the opinion of the authors that the remedial purpose of the
Florida Securities Act is the maintenance of full and fair disclosure of
all material facts to all investors. This remedial purpose does not, and
should not, include a cause of action for simple negligence. In a business
which is replete with technicalities, where errors in mathematics are
made even by automatic data processing systems, it seems patently un-
reasonable to subject individuals to enormous liability for simple mis-
takes. The purpose of the securities laws will not be furthered by such
liability. Indeed, the tremendous economic ramifications outweigh any
real advantage that might possibly be gained.
The authors urge that section 517.301(1)(b) be amended to read
"to make any untrue statement of a material fact, which statement or
omission is made with knowledge or with reasonable grounds to believe
that it is unture or misleading or which statement is made without knowl-
edge or reasonable grounds to believe that it is true."
G. In Connection with Purchase or Sale
SEC Rule 10B-5 applies the clause "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security" to the entire rule. Section 517.301 applies that
clause only to subsection (1) (b). Since this obviously leads to a different
result, it is urged that the phrase be applied to the entire section.
H. Statutes of Limitation
As stated above, section 517.301 should have its own statute of
limitations. The authors suggest that the action be required to be brought
within one year after the discovery of the prohibited act. However, the
statute should also have a maximum limitation of three years after the
purchase or sale.
X. PROPOSED STATUTE
The following statute is proposed by the authors to clearly effectuate
the policy of the Florida Securities Act:
Section 517. 301. FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS; FALSIFICA-
TION OR CONCEALMENT OF FACTS.
(1) It shall be unlawful, and a violation of the provisions of
this chapter, for any person in connection with the pur-
COMMENTS
chase or sale of any security in this state, including any
security exempted under the provisions of section 517.05,
and including any securities sold in any transaction ex-
empted under the provisions of section 517.06, directly
or indirectly-
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact, which statement or
omission is made with knowledge or with reasonable
grounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading, or
which statement is made without knowledge or reason-
able grounds to believe that it is true,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person,
(d) To knowingly and willfully falsify, conceal or cover
up any trick, scheme, or device, a material fact, or
make any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation, knowing the same to contain any false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry.
(2) Any person who participates in any act or transaction in
violation of (a), (b), (c), or (d) of subsection (1) shall
be liable to any person who shall purchase or sell any
security at a price which was affected by such act or trans-
action, and the person so injured may sue in any court of
competent jurisdiction to recover damages sustained as a
result of any such act or transaction. In any such suit, the
court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the
payment of the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable
costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, against either
party litigant. Every person who becomes liable to make
any payment under this section may recover contribution
as in cases of contract from any person, who, if joined in
the original suit, would have been liable to the same pay-
ment.
(3) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability
created under (a), (b), (c), or (d) of subsection (1) un-
less brought within one year after the discovery of the
untrue statement or omission, or after such discovery
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence. In no event shall any such action be brought to
enforce a civil liability created under this section more
than three years after the purchase or sale.
(4) It is unlawful in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
Florida securities commission to knowingly and willfully
falsify, conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme, or device,
a material fact, or make any false writing or document,
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraud-
ulent statement or entry.
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